The Case for Equality
Suppose we have two individuals with the same utility function, defined over their incomes: UA = U(IA) and UB = U(IB). This utility function is increasing in income, but is subject to diminishing marginal utility. That is, U’(I) > 0 and U"(I) < 0. There is a fixed amount of income, I, to be distributed between persons A and B and we wish to distribute this income between them so as to maximize the combined utility U = UA + UB.
To begin, we note that
B’s income is the amount left over after A gets IA.
That is, IB = I -IA. With this substitution,
we wish to maximize U = U(IA) + U(I
- IA) with respect to IA. Take the first
derivative, and equate to zero:
= U’(IA) -U’(I -IA)
= 0. As U’’(I) is strictly negative, this condition can hold only
if IA = I -IA, or IA
= ½I. That is, maximum combined utility is achieved only when each individual
gets exactly half the combined available income.