The Case for Equality

Suppose we have two individuals with the same utility function, defined over their incomes: UA = U(IA) and UB = U(IB). This utility function is increasing in income, but is subject to diminishing marginal utility. That is, U’(I) > 0 and U"(I) < 0. There is a fixed amount of income, I, to be distributed between persons A and B and we wish to distribute this income between them so as to maximize the combined utility U = UA + UB.

To begin, we note that B’s income is the amount left over after A gets IA. That is, IB = I -IA. With this substitution, we wish to maximize U = U(IA) + U(I - IA) with respect to IA. Take the first derivative, and equate to zero: = U’(IA) -U’(I -IA) = 0. As U’’(I) is strictly negative, this condition can hold only if IA = I -IA, or IA = ½I. That is, maximum combined utility is achieved only when each individual gets exactly half the combined available income.