Chapter 5 Culture, Management Style, and Business Systems 157 economy. Additionally, higher levels of bribery have been found in collectivistic (IDV) and high power distance (PDI) countries. Moreover, higher levels of bribery and legal constraints such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) have deterred firms’ participation in such countries.74 Firms seem generally to eschew investments in corrupt countries as well.75 Finally, when executives of multinational firms behave ethically in such countries, they also tend to promote more ethical business behaviors among their host country counterparts.76 Although bribery is a legal issue, it is also important to see bribery in a cultural context to understand different attitudes toward it. Culturally, attitudes about bribery are significantly different among different peoples. Some cultures seem to be more open about taking bribes, whereas others, like the United States, are publicly contemptuous of such practices. But U.S. firms are far from virtuous—we believe the TI “grade” of a C (7.3) to be about right. Regardless of where the line of acceptable conduct is drawn, there is no country where the people consider it proper for those in position of political power to enrich themselves through illicit agreements at the expense of the best interests of the nation. A first step in understanding the culture of bribery is to appreciate the limitless variations that are often grouped under the word bribery. The activities under this umbrella term range from extortion through subornation to lubrication. Bribery and Extortion. The distinction between bribery and extortion depends on whether the activity resulted from an offer or from a demand for payment. Voluntarily offered payment by someone seeking unlawful advantage is bribery. For example, it is bribery if an executive of a company offers a government official payment in exchange for the official incorrectly classifying imported goods so the shipment will be taxed at a lower rate than the correct classification would require. However, it is extortion if payments are extracted under duress by someone in authority from a person seeking only what he or she is lawfully entitled to. An example of extortion would be a finance minister of a country demanding heavy pay-ments under the threat that a contract for millions of dollars would be voided. On the surface, extortion may seem to be less morally wrong because the excuse can be made that “if we don’t pay, we don’t get the contract” or “the official (devil) made me do it.” But even if it is not legally wrong, it is morally wrong—and in the United States it is legally wrong. Lubrication and Subornation. Another variation of bribery is the difference between lubrication and subornation. Lubrication involves a relatively small sum of cash, a gift, or a service given to a low-ranking official in a country where such offerings are not prohibited by law. The purpose of such a gift is to facilitate or expedite the normal, lawful performance of a duty by that official. This practice is common in many countries of the world. A small payment made to dock workers to speed up their pace so that unloading a truck takes a few hours rather than all day is an example of lubrication. Subornation, in contrast, generally involves giving large sums of money—frequently not properly accounted for—designed to entice an official to commit an illegal act on behalf of the one offering the bribe. Lubrication payments accompany requests for a person to do a job more rapidly or more efficiently; subornation is a request for officials to turn their heads, to not do their jobs, or to break the law. Agent’s Fees. A third type of payment that can appear to be a bribe but may not be is an agent’s fee. When a businessperson is uncertain of a country’s rules and regulations, an agent may be hired to represent the company in that country. For example, an attorney Bribery: Variations on a Theme 74H. Rika Houston and John L. Graham, “Culture and Corruption in International Markets: Implications for Policy Makers and Managers,” Consumption, Markets, and Culture 4, no. 3 (2000), pp. 315 – 40; Jennifer D. Chandler and John L. Graham, “Relationship-Oriented Cultures, Corruption, and International Marketing Success,” Journal of Business Ethics 92, no. 2 (2010), pp. 251– 67. 75Utz Weitzel and Sjors Berns, “Cross-Border Takeovers, Corruption, and Related Aspects of Governance,” Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006), pp. 786 – 806; Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, “Who Cares about Corruption,” Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006), pp. 807–22. 76Yadong Luo, “Political Behavior, Social Responsibility, and Perceived Corruption: A Structural Perspective,” Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006), pp. 747– 66; Chuck C. Y. Kwok and Solomon Tadesse, “The MNC as an Agent of Change for Host-Country Institutions: FDI and Corruption,” Journal of International Business Studies 37 (2006), pp. 767–85.
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